Abstract. This paper describes a new di erential-style attack, which we call the boomerang attack. This attack has several interesting applications. First, we disprove the oft-repeated claim that eliminating all high-probability di erentials for the whole cipher is su cient to guarantee security against di erential attacks. Second, we show how to break COCONUT98, a cipher designed using decorrelation techniques to ensure provable security against di erential attacks, with an advanced di erential-style attack that needs just 2 16 adaptively chosen texts. Also, to illustrate the power of boomerang techniques, we give new attacks on Khufu-16 and on 16 rounds of CAST-256.
Introduction
One of the most powerful cryptanalytic techniques known in the open literature is di erential cryptanalysis BS93]. Di erential analysis has been used to break many published ciphers. It is understandable, then, that block cipher designers are typically quite anxious to ensure security against di erential style attacks.
The usual design procedure goes something like this. The algorithm designer obtains somehow an upper bound p on the probability of any di erential characteristic for the cipher. Then the designer invokes an oft-repeated \folk theorem" to justify that any successful di erential attack will require at least 1=p texts to break the cipher, which is supposed to allow us to conclude that the cipher is safe from di erential attacks. Unfortunately, this folk theorem is wrong. We exhibit an attack|which we call the boomerang attack|that can allow an adversary to beat the 1=p bound in some cases 1 . In particular, if the best characteristic for half of the rounds of the cipher has probability q, then the boomerang attack can be used in a successful attack needing O(q ?4 ) chosen texts. In some cases, we may have q ?4 p ?1 , in which case the boomerang attack allows one to beat the folk theorem's bound. Also, boomerang attacks sometimes allow for a more extensive use of structures than is available in conventional di erential attacks, which makes boomerang techniques more e ective than the preceding discussion might suggest. 1 Note that Biham et al.'s impossible di erentials BBS98,BBS99] also disprove the folk theorem. They show that if one can nd a di erential of su ciently low probability, the cipher can be broken. However, the boomerang attack in fact lets us make an sharper statement: even if no di erential for the whole cipher has probability that is too high or too low, the cipher might still be vulnerable to di erential-style attacks.
We give a surprisingly sharp example of this possibility in Sections 3{5 below, where we show how to break COCONUT98 V98] with just 2 16 chosen texts and 2 38 work, despite a proof that the best characteristic for the whole cipher must have probability p 2 ?64 . Our attack makes crucial use of a characteristic for half of the cipher with probability q 2 ?4 . This shows that the folk theorem can fail spectacularly, even for real-world ciphers.
We also extend the boomerang attack to use techniques from truncated differential analysis (see Section 6). As a result, we are able to analyze ciphers which admit good truncated di erentials. In Section 7 we show how to break 16 rounds of Khufu with 2 18 adaptive chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts and very little work. We also consider CAST-256 in Section 8, where we show how to break 16 rounds with 2 49:3 known texts 2 . Section 8 also brie y sketches the inside-out attack, a dual to the boomerang attack. Finally, Section 9 discusses some related work, and Section 10 concludes the paper.
The boomerang attack: a generic view
The boomerang attack is a di erential attack that attempts to generate a quartet structure at an intermediate value halfway through the cipher.
The attack considers four plaintexts P; P 0 ; Q; Q 0 , along with their respective ciphertexts C; C 0 ; D; D 0 ; we will defer describing how these are generated until later. Let E( ) represent the encryption operation, and decompose the cipher into E = E 1 E 0 , where E 0 represents the rst half of the cipher and E 1 represents the last half. We will use a di erential characteristic, call it ! , for E 0 , as well as a characteristic r ! r for E ?1
.
We want to cover the pair P; P 0 with the characteristic for E 0 , and to cover the pairs P; Q and P 0 ; Q 0 with the characteristic for E ?1 1 . Then (we claim) the pair Q; Q 0 is perfectly set up to use the characteristic ! for E ?1 0 . Let's examine why this is so. Consider the intermediate value after half of the rounds. When the previous three characteristics hold, we have
Note that this is exactly the condition required to start the characteristic ! for the inverse of the rst half of the cipher. When this characteristic also holds, we will have the same di erence in the plaintexts Q; Q 0 as found in the original plaintexts P; P 0 . This is why we call it the boomerang attack: when you send it properly, it always comes back to you.
2
See also Appendix B, where we show that CAST-256 would be much weaker if the round ordering was reversed: in particular, boomerang attacks would be able to break 24 rounds of this variant of 2 48:5 chosen texts. Please note that this 24-round boomerang attack does not apply to the real CAST-256 AES proposal.
We de ne a right quartet as one where all four characteristics hold simultaneously. The only remaining issue is how to choose the texts so they have the right di erences. We suggest generating P 0 = P , and getting the encryptions C; C 0 of P; P 0 with two chosen-plaintext queries. Then we generate D; D 0 as D = C r and D 0 = C 0 r. Finally we decrypt D; D 0 to obtain the plaintexts Q; Q 0 with two adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider several concrete attacks using the boomerang attack.
3 The COCONUT98 algorithm
The COCONUT98 cipher V98] may be of special interest to some readers because of its reliance on the recently-developed theory of decorrelation techniques for block cipher design V97,V98,V98b,GGH+98]. Using decorrelation techniques, V98] proves that the full COCONUT98 cipher admits no good differential characteristics. Despite this fact, we observe that there are di erential characteristics of very high probability for half of the cipher, and we make extensive use of these characteristics in our attack. This suggests that the decorrelation design technique may fail to provide security against advanced di erential attacks in some cases if extra care is not taken. This is not to suggest that the decorrelation approach is fundamentally awed|indeed, decorrelation theory seems like a very useful tool for the cipher designer|but rather that the theoretical results must be interpreted with caution.
We brie y recount the description of the COCONUT98 algorithm. CO-CONUT98 uses a 256-bit key K = (K 1 ; : : : ; K 8 ). The key schedule generates eight round subkeys k 1 ; : : : ; k 8 as i
The last four key words are used to build a decorrelation module M(xy) = (xy K 5 K 6 ) K 7 K 8 mod GF(2 64 ) where concatenation of symbols (e.g. xy) represents the concatenation of their values as bitstrings.
Next, we build a Feistel network as follows. Let (x) = x + 256 S(x mod 256) mod 2 32 F i ((x; y)) = (y; x (ROL 11 ( (y k i )) + c mod 2 32 )) i = F 4i+4 F 4i+3 F 4i+2 F 4i+1 where ROL 11 ( ) represents a left rotation by 11 bits, c is a public 32-bit constant, and S : Z 8 2 ! Z 24 2 is a xed S-box.
With this notation, COCONUT98 is de ned as 1 M 0 . In other words, COCONUT98 consists of four Feistel rounds with subkeys k 1 ; : : : ; k 4 , followed by an evaluation of the decorrelation module M, and nally four more Feistel rounds with subkeys k 5 ; : : : ; k 8 .
Di erential characteristics for COCONUT98
This section discusses the di erential characteristics of COCONUT98. In the following discussion, let e j = 2 j be the 32-bit xor di erence with just the j-th bit ipped. (Subscripts are taken modulo 32, for convenience in modeling the ROL( ; 11) operation.)
We note that the Feistel rounds of COCONUT98 admit very good di erential characteristics. The main observation is that e j ! e j+11 by the Feistel function with probability 1=2 when j 2 J = f8; 9; : : :; 19; 20; 29; 30; 31g. 3 Similarly, e j e k ! e j+11 e k+11 with probability 1=4 when j; k 2 J (j 6 = k). for has probability 0:83 2 ?4 2 ?4:3 . (There are also other rotated versions of this characteristic which hold with similar probabilities, though we will not need them in our analysis.) Of course, by symmetry we also get corresponding backwards characteristics for decryption through four Feistel rounds.
This suggests that we ought to try to nd some way to take advantage of these high-probability characteristics for the half-cipher in our analysis. However, the task is not so easy as it might rst look. If we try to mount a traditional di erential attack on the whole cipher, the decorrelation module M will immediately cause serious di culties. When the key words K 7 ; K 8 are unknown, it is very di cult to push any di erential characteristic through M. More precisely, every di erential ! for M with ; 6 = 0 has average probability 1=(2 64 ?1), where the probability is averaged over all possible key values. In short, the decorrelation module prevents us from pushing a di erential characteristic past M. This is where the boomerang attack comes in handy: the boomerang quartet property allows us to control the e ect of the decorrelation module in the middle.
The crucial idea which lets the attack work is that M is a ne, and thus for any xed key there are excellent characteristics r ! M ?1 (r ) of probability 1 for M ?1 . Take E 0 = 0 and E 1 = 1 M. Then if r ! r is a good characteristic for ?1 1 we will obtain a good characteristic r ! M ?1 (r ) for E ?1 1 . It does not matter that M ?1 (r) is unknown to the attacker; the crucial property is that it depends only on the key (and not on the values of the ciphertexts).
Let us estimate the success probability for this technique. We need two characteristics for 0 For COCONUT98, this can be used to signi cantly increase the probability of attack. Empirically, we nd that = r = (e 10 ; e 31 ) provides p 0:023 0:023 1=1900.
5 The basic boomerang attack on COCONUT98
Next we show how to use the quartet property established above to mount a practical attack on COCONUT98. We use a 1-R attack, so the criterion for success is that Q Q 0 = (?; e 31 ) where ? represents an arbitrary word. This improves the success probability p by a factor of two, to 1=950.
It is immediately clear from this discussion that COCONUT98 can be easily distinguished from an ideal cipher with at most about 950 4 = 3800 adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext queries. However, we aim for more: a key-recovery attack.
The key-recovery attack proceeds along relatively standard lines. In about 16 950 trials requiring 16 950 4 adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext queries, we generate about 16 useful quartets. Note that the signal-to-noise is extremely high, so we should be able to lter out all wrong quartets very e ectively.
First, we recover K 1 . We guess K 1 , and peel o the rst round. We use the fact that if P; P 0 ; Q; Q 0 form a quartet with the property above, then the xor di erence after one round of encryption must be (e 31 ; 0) for both the P; P 0 pair and the Q; Q 0 pair. This condition holds for 1/2 of the wrong key values. Therefore each quartet gives one bit of information on K 1 from the P; P 0 pair and another bit of information from the Q; Q 0 pair. With 16 useful quartets, we expect K 1 to be identi ed uniquely.
Next, we recover K 2 K 4 by decrypting up one round and examining the xor di erence in the C; D pair and in the C 0 ; D 0 pair. The details are very similar to those used to learn K 1 .
This allows us to peel o the rst and last rounds of the cipher. Then we repeat the attack on the reduced cipher. For instance, we can use about 8 144 4 more adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext queries to generate about 8 useful quartets for the reduced cipher if we use the same settings for ; r, since then the success probability p increases to about 1=144. Using these 8 useful quartets for the reduced cipher we learn K 3 ; and we repeat the attack iteratively until the entire key is known.
In all, the complexity of the attack is about 16 950 4 + 8 144 4 + : : : 2 16 adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext queries. The attack requires 8 2 32 2 32 = 2 41 o ine computations of the F function, which is work comparable to that required for 2 38 trial encryptions. The attack can also be converted to a knownplaintext attack, but then the complexity increases dramatically to 2 52 texts.
The best conventional attack on COCONUT98 we could nd was a meetin-the-middle attack that exploits a weakness in the key schedule. However, the meet-in-the-middle attack requires approximately 2 96 trial encryptions, so our chosen-text boomerang attack compares very favorably to it. See Appendix A for more details on the meet-in-the-middle attack.
Fixing the cipher would require careful changes to its internal design. One possible approach would be to replace the four-round Feistel network by a transformation with much more strength against di erential cryptanalysis (say, 16 rounds instead of 4). Another possible approach is to use a decorrelation module in each round; this seems likely to prevent boomerang-style attacks, and is in fact the approach proposed in the DFC AES submission GGH+98]. (Using just a decorrelation module before the rst round and after the last round is not enough|di erential-style attacks are still possible.)
It is clear that the mere use of decorrelation techniques is not enough to guarantee security against di erential-style attacks. At the same time, although it does not provide the conjectured 2 64 security level, COCONUT98's decorrelation module does seem to improve the cipher's security. Without a decorrelation module, COCONUT98 would be vulnerable to conventional di erential attacks requiring on the order of 2 8 chosen texts, so in this case the decorrelation module seems to have approximately squared the security level of the base cipher.
Extensions to truncated di erential analysis
So far we have con ned the discussion to conventional di erential characteristics, but it seems natural to wonder whether boomerang attacks can also be made to work using truncated di erentials. The answer is yes, but there are some di culties.
The pitfall with extensions to truncated di erentials is that than any other technique we know of, so they seem to be more promising in the long run.
In our boomerang attack, we exploit that there are excellent truncated differentials available for both halves of the cipher. For the rst half of the cipher, we use = (0; 0; 0; a; b; c; d; e) ! (0; 0; 0; a; 0; 0; 0; 0) = ; which holds with probability 2 ?32 in the forward direction and probability 1 in the reverse direction. We will hold a xed throughout the attack. For the inverse of the last half of the cipher, we use r = (0; 0; 0; a; 0; 0; 0; 0) ! (0; 0; 0; a; f; g; h; i) = r , which holds with probability 1. Also, due to a careful choice of r ; , we have Pr w x y 2 j w 2 ; x; y 2 r ] = 1. Thus 2 ?32 of the quartets chosen according to these di erences will form right quartets.
One can use structures to reduce the number of texts needed. Choose a pool where ; take on 2 10 possible values; C; C 0 ; D; D 0 ; Q; Q 0 are generated from P; P 0 as before. Now each such quartet is guaranteed to be a right quartet (if (L; R i ); (L 0 ; R 0 j ) formed a right quartet) because we have successfully bypassed the rst round. Thus, any wrong quartets which survived the earlier ltering phase are easily eliminated. Furthermore, given 2 10 right quartets we expect to be able to form 2 10 equations of the form S 1 (x) S 1 (y) = z for known values of x; y; z, and this should be su cient to recover S 1 up to a xor by a 32-bit constant. Then the 8-round reduced cipher can be broken trivially.
In total, this attack on Khufu-16 requires 2 18 + 4 2 10 2 18 adaptively chosen texts. The workfactor is minimal.
Inside-out attacks
In this section, we sketch a description of the \inside-out attack," which may be viewed as a dual to the boomerang attack. The di erence is that the boomerang attack works from the outside in while the inside-out attack works from the inside out.
In the inside-out attack, we search for pairs of texts which contain a desired di erence at the intermediate value after half the rounds. We hope that the di erential ! 0 for E 1 and the di erential ! for E ?1 0 both hold. In this case, we will have recognizable di erences and 0 in the plaintexts and ciphertexts of the pair. If we accumulate enough pairs with the di erence halfway through the cipher, we should be able to nd at least one right pair where both di erentials hold.
To illustrate these ideas in action, we analyze 16 rounds of CAST-256. CAST-256 Ada98] is a generalized Feistel block cipher, whose simplicity makes it a nice test-bed to explore the properties of generalized Feistel round structures.
We brie y recall the de nition of CAST-256 here. The 128-bit block is divided into four 32-bit words, and a Feistel function F : Z 32 2 ! Z 32 2 is used to update the block. There are two types of rounds, which we shall call \A rounds" and \B rounds" in a choice of terminology inspired by Skipjack. An A round encrypts the input block (w; x; y; z) to (z; w; x; y F(z)), and a B round encrypts to (x; y; z F(w); w). Note that A B ?1 ; by this we mean that the structure of the inverse of a B round is the same as the structure of an A round, not that they are true functional inverses. With this terminology, the CAST-256 cipher structure is de ned as B 24 A 24 , i.e. 24 A rounds followed by 24 B rounds.
The CAST-256 structure admits many nice truncated di erentials. In our boomerang attack, we will use = (0; 0; 0; a) ! (0; b; c; a) = 0 , which holds with probability 1 for 8 B rounds, and = (0; 0; 0; a) ! (0; d; e; a), which holds with probability 1 for decrypting though 8 A rounds.
The signal-to-noise ratio of the inside-out attack will be reasonably good, because right pairs can be recognized by a 96-bit ltering condition.
To implement the attack, we collect 2 49:3 known texts encrypted under 16 rounds of CAST-256. By the birthday paradox, we expect to see three right pairs among those texts, which can be readily recognized. (We also expect to get three wrong pairs, but they should be eliminated in the next phase.) Then we search over the last round subkey. Each guess at the 37 key bits entering the last round suggests 2 5 possible values for the 37 key bits entering the next-to-last round; the three right pairs allow us to uniquely recognize the correct values for the last two round subkeys. The rst two round subkeys can be recovered by analogous techniques. Finally, the attack may be repeated on the reduced-round cipher.
To sum up, we see how to break 16 rounds of CAST-256 with an inside-out attack that needs just 2 49:3 known texts and very little work. This attack is independent of the de nition of F function or key schedule, and depends only on the round structure.
There are two implications of our analysis. First, it indicates that CAST-256 reduced to 16 rounds would not be adequately secure. Since CAST-256 with 48 rounds is 2{2.5 times slower on high-end CPUs than the fastest AES candidates SKW+98], this suggests that CAST-256's security-to-performance ratio may not be as high as some other contenders. On the other hand, security clearly must take precedence over performance, and here our analysis provides some support for the CAST-256 design. We have seen that CAST-256's round ordering is ideally-suited to resist boomerang attacks (see Appendix B), and due to the sheer number of rounds, it seems very hard to extend our inside-out attack to the full cipher.
Related work
The boomerang attack is closely related to many other ideas that have previously occurred in the literature. As a result, there are many di erent ways to think about the boomerang attack. In this section, we will try to survey the possibilities.
The boomerang attack is related to the di erential-linear attack of HL94]. In a di erential-linear attack, one covers E 0 with a truncated di erential ! , covers E ?1 1 with a linear approximation ? ! ? , and nally covers E 1 with a second approximation ? ! ?; there is also the additional requirement that ? x be constant for all x 2 . From this perspective, one could think of the boomerang attack as a \di erential-di erential" attack (if the reader will indulge a slight abuse of terminology).
A similar observation is that the boomerang attack is closely related to higher-order di erential techniques Lai94,Knu95]. As noted in Section 6, the pairs P; Q, P 0 ; Q 0 don't actually need to follow r ! r : it is su cient that E ?1 1 (P ) E ?1 1 (P 0 ) E ?1 1 (Q) E ?1 boomerang attack can be considered as an intermediate step between conventional di erential and higher-order di erential attacks. One of the interesting features of the boomerang attack is that it is apparently very well-suited to the analysis of ciphers that use asymmetric round functions 4 . Asymmetric round functions can be classi ed into one of two types: the A round, which has better di usion in the forward direction than in the reverse direction, and the B round, which has better di usion in the reverse direction. We note that when the rst half of the cipher is built of B-type rounds and the last half is built of A-type rounds, boomerang attacks seem to be especially dangerous because they allow one to probe from both endpoints at the same time.
This supplies some intuition for how the boomerang attack works. It would not be unreasonable to think of the boomerang attack as a di erential meetin-the-middle attack that uses di erentials to work from the outside in; the interesting bit is what happens where the di erentials \meet" in the middle of the cipher.
Another precursor of the boomerang attack is the \double-swiping" attack KSW97], a di erential related-key attack on NewDES-1996 that (in retrospect) can be seen as a boomerang-style attack (with minor adjustments to take advantages of related-key queries, as allowed in KSW97]'s extended threat model).
One disadvantage of the boomerang attack is that it inherently requires the ability to perform both adaptive chosen-plaintext and adaptive chosenciphertext queries at once, a rare requirement to nd in a practical attack. We are aware of only two other attacks with this property: (1) the adaptive chosenplaintext/ciphertext attack on the 3-round Luby-Racko cipher, which is also used to good e ect in some of Knudsen's work Knu98] on Luby-Racko ciphers with more rounds, and (2) Biham et. al's yo-yo game BBD+98], which is closely related to their more-famous miss-in-the-middle attack BBS98, BBS99] .
The relation between the boomerang attack and the miss-in-the-middle attack is a close and interesting one. It seems that the boomerang attack is little more than a chosen-plaintext/ciphertext version of the miss-in-the-middle attack. In particular, if Pr ! ] = Pr r ! r ] = 1 and \ r = ;, then the same pair of di erentials can be used to obtain either a miss-in-the-middle attack (using the impossible di erential ! r) or a boomerang attack. This paper showed that in some cases the boomerang attack can improve on the miss-in-the-middle attack, if adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext queries are available. However, we conjecture that these cases are not representative. There is some anecdotal evidence BBS98] to suggest that miss-in-the-middle attacks can often penetrate through more rounds than boomerang attacks. For instance, we saw one example of this phenomenon in our analysis of Khufu, and another example may be found in Appendix B. Though a thorough comparison of the two types of attacks continues to elude us, we hope that this work will stimulate further research into the interaction between these two attacks.
We have described a new way to use di erential-style techniques for cryptanalysis of block ciphers. Our attacks can break some ciphers that are immune to ordinary di erential cryptanalysis, and can provide a powerful new way to analyze ciphers with asymmetrical round structures. To protect against these attacks, cipher designers should ensure that there are no good di erentials for the rst or last half of their cipher.
